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purpose of the policy which might otherwise restrict self-
dealing transactions can no longer be accomplished and the 
policy is no longer a controlling consideration. There is here 
the added safeguard of a statutory standard by which the 
services performed for the estate may be objectively evaluated. 
[4] It is well settled that the paramount rule in the con-
struction of a will is that the will must be interpreted accord-
ing to the intention of the testator (Estate of Wilson, 184 Cal. 
63, 66-67 [193 P. 581]; Estate of Murphy, 157 Cal. 63, 69 [106 
P. 230, 137 Am.St.Rep. 110]; Estate of Young, 123 Cal. 337, 
344 [55 P. 1011]; Estate of Newman, 68 Cal.App. 420, 423 
[229 P. 898]; 26 Cal.Jnr. 897), and that intention must be 
given effect as far as possible. (Pro b. Code, § 101.) In the 
present case there can be no dispute as to the intention of 
the testatrix and hence the only problem is the fulfillment 
of that intention. Her direction in disposing of her estate 
should be given effect as she has provided. 
The order is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and McComb, J., concurred. 
[L.A. No. 24861. In Bank. July 17, 1958.] 
CLAUDE ALARID, Appellant, v. ALEXANDER J. 
VANIER, Respondent. 
[1] Negligence-Violation of Statute-Rebuttal of Presumption.-
The presumption of negligence which arises from the violation 
of a statute is rebuttable and may be overcome by evidence 
of justification or excuse. 
(2] Automobiles-Violation of Regulations.-In an action for per-
sonal injuries and property damage suffered when plaintiff's 
car, which had stopped behind five other cars at an inter 
section, was struck in the rear by an automobile driven by de-
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 25; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 158 
et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Automobiles, §§ 188, 213; Am.Jur., Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic, § 231 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Negligence,§ 91; [2] Automobiles, 
§155(1); [4] Appeal and Error, §1095; [5] Automobiles, §273a; 
[6] Automobiles, J 355(5); [7] Negligence,§ 181; [8] Automobiles, 
§§ 386(1), 386(2); [9] Appeal and Error, § 48.1. 
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there was no evidence of contributory negli-
from defendant's admission that a 
of his brakes was a cause of the accident, 
defendant would be liable as a matter of law in the absence of 
sui'ficient excuse or justification for violation of Veh. Code, 
§§ as they read at the time of the accident. 
[3] Negligence-Violation of Statute-Rebuttal of Presumption.-
The correct test to be applied in determining whether a person 
a statute has overcome the presumption of negli-
gence is he has sustained the burden of showing that 
he did what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordi-
nary prudence acting under similar circumstances who desired 
to comply >vith the law, rather than that justification or excuse 
can be found only in causes or things "beyond the control of 
the person charged with the violation" (disapproving inconsist-
ent language in Ornales v. Wigger, 35 Cal.2d 474, 479 [218 P.2d 
531]; Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal.2d 581, 
589 [177 P.2d 279]; Gruss v. Coast Transpo1·t, Inc., 154 Cal. 
App.2d 85, 87-90 [315 P.2d 339]; Miller v. Jensen, 137 Cal.App. 
2d 251, 256-257 [290 P.2d 52]; Ga1·cia v. Webb, 131 Cal.App.2d 
448, 450-451 P.2d 829]; Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 
129 CaLApp.2d 67, 77-79 [276 P.2d 703]; Kuehn v. Lowthian, 
124 Cal.App.2d 867, 871-872 [269 P.2d 666]; Gmf v. Garcia, 
117 Cal.App.2d 792, 797-798 [256 P.2d 995]; Carlson v. She-
walter, 110 Cul.App.2d 655, 658 [243 P.2d 549]; Parmalee v. 
Bartolomei, 106 Cal.App.2d 68, 70-72 [234 P.2d 1019]; Wilker-
son v. Brown, 84 Cai.App.2d 401, 466-407 [190 P.2d 958]; 
JJfecchi v. Lyon Van cf" Storage Co., 38 Cal.App.2d 674, 682-688 
[102 P.2d 422]; Gallichotte v. Calif. Mut. etc. Assn., 4 Cal.App. 
2d 503, 506 [ 41 P.2d 349]; M01·ris v. Purity Sausage Co., 2 Cal. 
App.2d 536, 539-540 [38 P.2d 193] ), or that the jury may 
assume that a person of ordinary prudence will reasonably en-
deavor to obey the law and will do so unless causes, not of his 
own intended making, induce him, without moral fault, to do 
otherwise (disapproving inconsistent language in Combs v. Los 
Angeles Ry. Co1·p., 29 Cal.2d 606, 609-611 [177 P.2d 293]; 
McEachen v. Richmond, 150 Cal.App.2d 546, 551 [310 P.2d 
122] ). 
[ 4] Appeal-Right to Allege Error-Invited Error-Instructions. 
-Plaintiff in an automobile collision case was in no position 
to complain of an erroneous instruction that, in order to over-
come the presumption of negligence, the evidence must show 
that the statutory violation resulted from causes or things 
beyond the control of the person charged with the violation, 
where he requested it and it was more favorable to him than a 
statement of the proper rule. 
[5] Automobiles-Province of Court and Jury-Directed Verdict. 
-In an action for personal injuries and property damage suf-
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fered when plaintiff's car, which had behind five other 
cars at an intersection, was struck in the rear by an automobile 
driven by defendant, evidence that defendant drove the auto-
mobile to test the brakes when he purchased it, that they were 
then in good condition, that during the five months elapsing 
prior to the accident there was nothing with the brakes 
and that they were "working in 
months after the he at a 
service station was given a service and guaran-
tee," that a few weeks before the accident a garage did some 
work on the clutch and no suggestion was then made that there 
was anything wrong with the brakes, and that on the day of the 
accident he drove 10 miles to his place of employment, stop-
ping at numerous intersections, and the brakes worked per-
fectly, presented a question to the jury as to whether defendant 
took sufficient steps to meet his obligation to maintain his 
brakes in good condition, and plaintiff's motion for a directed 
verdict was properly denied. 
[6] !d.-Instructions-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-In an action for per-
sonal injuries and property damage suffered when plaintiff's 
car, which had stopped behind five other cars at an inter-
section, was struck in the rear by an automobile driven by de-
fendant, it was error to give an instruction that "the mere 
fact that an accident happened, considered alone, does not sup-
port an inference that some party, or nny party, to this action 
was negligent," where the uncontradicted evidence warranted 
the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
[7] Negligence-Instructions-Inference of Negligence-Violation 
of Statute.-The giving of an instruction that the mere fact 
that an accident happened, considered alone, does not support 
an inference that some party, or any party, to the action was 
negligent, constitutes error where a presumption of negligence 
arises as a result of defendant's disobedience of a statute. 
[8] Automobiles-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-In an 
action for personal injuries and property damage suffered 
when plaintiff's car, which had stopped behind five other cars 
at an intersection, was struck in the rear by an automobile 
driven by defendant, errors in giving instructions requested 
by defendant on unavoidable accident and that "the mere fact 
that an accident happened, considered alone, does not support 
an inference that some party, or any party, to this action was 
negligent" did not result in a miscarriage of justice requiring 
reversal of a judgment for defendant, where there were in-
structions that under the admitted facts a prima facie case had 
been proved against defendant and that, in order to escape 
liability, he must exculpate himself by showing justification or 
excuse, and where the evidence on this issue was uncontra-
620 ALARID V. VANIER [50 C.2d 
dieted and sufficient to show that prior to the accident defend-
ant took reasonable precautions to see that his brakes were in 
working condition. 
[9] Appeal-Decisions Appealable--Verdict.-No appeal lies from 
a verdict. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange 
Robert Gardner, Judge. Judgment affirmed; ap-
peal from verdict dismissed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries and property 
damage arising out of an automobile accident. Judgment for 
defendant affirmed. 
Simon & McKinsey and Thomas W. McKinsey for Ap-
pellant. 
Powell & Banyard, Robert A. Banyard and Robert B. Powell 
for Respondent. 
GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiff brought this action to recover for 
personal injuries and property damage suffered when his 
car was struck in the rear by an automobile driven by de-
fendant. He appeals from a judgment in favor of defendant, 
contending that the judgment is contrary to the evidence 
and that he was prejudiced by certain instructions given 
at defendant's request. 
The manner in which the accident occurred is undiRputed. 
Plaintiff was driving south in the outside lane of a level, four-
lane asphalt highway. It was a clear day, and the pavement 
was dry. He brought his car to a stop approximately 100 feet 
north of an intersection which had stop signs at all four 
corners. Five cars had stopped between plaintiff and the 
intersection, and, after he had been there for 15 or 20 seconds, 
waiting for the traffic to proceed, he heard a squeal of brakes 
and the rear of his car was struck by the front of defendant's 
car. 
Defendant testified that he had driven onto the highway 
two and a half blocks north of the scene of the accident, and, 
as he proceeded toward the intersection, he observed plain-
tiff's car coming to a stop. When traveling at 20 miles per 
hour and about 200 feet from the place where plaintiff had 
stopped, defendant applied his brakes, hut they did not take 
hold. There was no resistance to the pressure which he ap-
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plied, and the peual went all the way to the floor. Defendant 
could not turn to the left because another automobile was 
there, and he was afraid to turn to the right, toward a ditch, 
for fear he might tip oYer. In the stress of the moment he 
decided to g·o straight ahead, and he was so excited he did 
not think of using the hand brake. vVituesses who examined 
defendant's ear after the accident testified that the br·ake 
pedal, when tested, went down to the floor without resistance 
and that there were ''no brakes.'' 
The parties agree that, under the undisputed evidence, 
a presumption of negligence upon the part of defendant 
arose by reason of the operation of sections 670 and 679 of 
the Vehicle Code as they read at the time of the accident. 
Section 670 then provided: '' (a) No person shall operate on 
any highway any motor vehicle ... unless such motor ve-
hicle . . . is equipped with brakes adequate to bring such 
motor vehicle ... to a complete stop when operated upon 
dry asphalt or concrete pavement surface where the grade 
does not exceed 1 per cent at the speeds set forth in the 
following table within the distances set opposite such speeds: 
[The stopping distance for a speed of 20 miles per hour was 
fixed at 37 feet.*] . . . (c) If a vehicle is equipped with 
more than one system of brakes, each shall be maintained in 
good working order .... " Section 679 declared that it was 
unlawful to operate on any highway any vehicle which was 
in an unsafe condition or was not equipped as required by the 
code. 
[1] The presumption of negligence which arises from the 
violation of a statute is rebuttable and may be overcome by 
evidence of justification or excuse. (Gallup v. Sparks-],! undo 
Engineering Co., 43 Ca1.2d 1, 9 [271 P.2d 34] ; Tossman v. 
Newman, 37 Cal.2d 522, 525 [233 P.2d 1].) [2] There is 
no evidence of contributory neglig·ence, and, since it is clear 
from defendant's admission that the failure of his brakes was 
a proximate cause of the accident, it follows that defendant 
would be liable as a matter of law in the absence of a suffi-
cient excuse or justification for violation of the code. It is 
plaintiff's contention that defendant did not produce enough 
evidence to rebut the presumption and, therefore, that the 
*The provisions relating to stopping distances now appear in section 
670.05 of the Vehicle Code, which specifies a maximum stopping distance 
of 25 feet for a car like defendant's when traveling at a speed of 20 
miles per hour. 
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trial court erred in 's motion for a direeted 
verdict upon the issue of liability. In upon this con-
tention we must consider what rule is to be applied in deter-
mining whether defendant has overcome the presumption. 
A number of cases, although varying -;onsiderably in 
the stand for the proposition that 
where a person has a statute he may excuse or 
the violation evidence that he did what might rea-
be of a person of ordinary prudence acting 
undm· similar circumstances who desired to comply with the 
standard of conduct establishrd the statute. (See Nevis 
v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 43 Cal.2d 626, 633 P.2d 761] 
l" nonnegligent" ignorance of facts] ; Gray v. B1·inkerhofj, 41 
Cal.2d 180, 184 [258 P.2d 834] [declaring that the violator 
could have fulfilled his duty ''if he had exercised ordinary 
care"] ; .. Wh1'techat v. Guyette, 19 Cal.2d 428, 436-438 [122 
P.2d 47]; Berkovitz v. American River Gravel Co., 191 Cal. 
195, 198-200 [215 P. 675] [unlighted tail light]; Edgett v. 
Fairchild, 153 Ca1.App.2d 734, 738-739 [314 P.2d 973] ; Mc-
Eachcn v. Richmond, 150 Cal.App.2d 546, 550 [310 P.2d 
122] ; Bryant v. 'Tulare Ice Co., 125 Cal.App.2d 566, 569 [270 
P.2d 880]; Taylor v . • Jackson, 123 Cal.App.2d 199, 201-202 
[266 P.2d 605] ; Fuentes v. Panella, 120 Cal.App.2d 175, 183-
184 [260 P.2d 853]; Driver v. Norman, 106 Cal.App.2d 725, 
727-728 [236 P.2d 6]; Merry v. Knudsen Creamery Co., 94 
Cal.App.2d 715, 719 et seq. [211 P.2d 905] [brake failure]; 
Dennis v. Gonzales, 91 Cal.App.2d 203, 206, 209-210 [205 P.2d 
55] ; Mats1tmoto v. Renner, 90 Cal.App.2d 406, 411 f202 P.2d 
1051] [unlighted tail light]; Takahashi v. White Tntek etc. 
Co., 15 Cal.App.2d 107, 110 [59 P.2d 161] [unlighted tail 
light] ; Nelson v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 10 Cal.App.2d 448, 
449-450 [51 P.2d 885] [unlighted taillight]; Hardin v. Suth-
erland, 106 Cal.App. 473, 479-480 [289 P. 900] ; Rath v. 
Bankston, 101 Cal.App. 274, 279-284 [281 P. 1081] [dictum re 
brake failure] ; Phillips v. Pickwick Stages, 85 Cal.App. 571, 
573-574 [259 P. 968] [dictum re brake failnrc]; Giorgetti v. 
Wollaston, 83 Cal.App. 358, 363 [257 P. 109] [unlighted tail 
light]; cf. M & M etc. Transport Co. v. California Auto Trans-
p01·t Co., 43 Cal.2d 847 [279 P.2d 13] .) 
In a second group of cases it is stated or indicated that 
justification or excuse for violation of a statute can be found 
only in causes or things "beyond the control of the person 
charged with the violation." (See Onwles v. W iggcr, 35 Cal. 
2d 474, 479 [218 P.2d 531]; Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School 
July 1958] ALARID VANIER 
[50 C.2d 617; 327 P.2d 897] 
623 
-----------------
Dist., 29 Cal.2d 589 [177 P.2d 279]; Gruss Coast Trans-
port, Inc., 154 Cal.App.2d 87-90 P.2d Miller 
v. Jensen, 137 Cal.App.2d 251, 256-2G7 [290 P.2c1 
v. Webb, 131 Cal.App.2d 448, 450-451 P.2d 
v. So7dhern Pacific Co., 129 Cal.App.2c1 67, 77-79 P.2d 
703]; Kuehn v. 124 CaL'\pp.2d 867, 871-872 [269 
P.2d 666]; Graf v. 117 Cal.App.2d 797-798 [256 
P.2d 995] Carlson v. Shc1Daltcr, 110 658 
[243 P.2d 549]; Parmalee v. Bartolomei, 106 Cal.App.2d 68, 
70-72 [234 P.2d 1019] ; Wilkerson v. 84 Cal.App.2d 
401, 406-407 [190 P.2d 958]; Jtlccchi v. Lyon Van & Storage 
Co., 38 Cal.App.2d 674, 682-683 [102 P.2d 422]; Gallichotte v. 
California JJiut. etc. Assn., 4 Cal.App.2d 503, 506 [ 41 P.2d 
349]; Mor1·is v. Purity Sa1tsage Co., 2 Cal.App.2d 536, 539-540 
[38 P.2d 193].) Instructions to this effect are contained in 
California Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 149 and No. 149.1, but 
the authors state that these were included in deference to a 
dictum in Ornales v. Wigger, 35 Cal.2d 474, 479 [218 P.2d 
531], and that such an instruction sets up a confusing and 
impossible standard. (See 1 CaL Jury Instns., Civ. (4th rev. 
ed., 1956), pp. 392-393.) Many of the cases in this group have 
not applied the "beyond the control" test strictly but, rather, 
have used it in the sense that the factors or causes involved 
would not have been anticipated and guarded against by a 
person of ordinary prudence who wished to obey the statute. 
·A third method of expressing what would serve as a justi-
fication or excuse is found in an instruction, approved by 
some cases, which declares that the jury may assume that a 
person of ordinary prudence will reasonably endeavor to obey 
the law and will do so unless causes, not of his own intended 
making, induce him, without moral fault, to do otherwise. 
(Combs v. Los Angdes Ry. Corp., 29 Cal.2d 606, 609-611 [177 
P.2d 293] ; see JJ1cEachen v. Richmond, 150 Cal.App.2d 546, 
551 [310 P.2d 122]; see also Cal. Jury Instns., Civ. (4th rev. 
ed., 1956), pp. 392-393.) However, it has been held not 
error to refuse to give this instruetion because it contains 
vag·ue and shadowy concepts which laelc the precision of good 
legal definition. ( Cucnk v. Payne, 140 CaLApp.2d 881, 887 
[296 P .2d 7].) The criticism seems to be valid, sinee it would 
be difficult, if not impossible, for jurors to understand from 
this language what they were expected to look for in passing 
upon the conduct of the person who is charged with having 
violated the statute. 
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[3] In our opinion the correct test is whether the person 
vvho has violated a statute has sustained the burden of showing 
that he did what might reasonably be expected of a person 
of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who 
desired to comply with the law. The language contained in 
the second and third groups of eases referred to above is dis-
approved insofar as it is inconsistent with the rule just stated. 
[4] The jury in the present case was instructed that, in 
order to overcome the presumption of negligence, the evi-
dence must show that the statutory violation resulted from 
causes or things beyond the control of the person charged with 
the violation. Plaintiff, howeYer, is not in a position to com-
plain of this instruction since he requested it and it was more 
favorable to him than a statement of the proper rule. 
[5] When the correct test is applied to the facts of the 
present ease, it appears that the evidence is sufficient to go 
to a jury on the question whether defendant acted as an ordi-
nary prudent man who wished to comply with the statutory 
requirements as to brakes. Defendant's automobile was a 
1949 model which he had purchased in January 1955, and 
it was equipped with hydraulic foot brakes and a mechanical 
hand brake which worked independently. There is evidence 
that he drove the car to test the brakes when he purchased it 
and that they were in good condition. During the five months 
which elapsed prior to the accident, there was nothing wrong 
with the brakes and they were "working in perfect condi-
tion." Defendant had the car lubricated at a service station 
in April 1955 and was given a service ''receipt and guaran-
tee'' which indicated that the wheel brake cables and master 
cylinder had been inspected and lubricated and that no service 
or replacements were recommended. A few vveeks before the 
accident a garage did some work on the clutch, and at that 
time no suggestion was made to defendant that there was 
anything wrong with the brakes. On the day of the accident 
defendant drove 10 miles to his place of employment, stopping 
at numerous intersections, and the brakes worked perfectly. 
The car was parked at 7 :45 in the morning and was not 
driven until defendant's quitting time at 4 :30 p.m. After he 
left his parking place, it was not neecssary for him to apply 
the brakes until he reached the scene of the accident, about 
two and a half bloeks away, and he had no warning of any 
kind that there was anything wrong with the brakes. 
The evidence thus presents a question for the jury as to 
whether defendant took sufficient steps to meet his obligation 
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to maintain his brakes in good condition, and plaintiff's mo-
tion for a directed verdict was properly denied. 
[6] Plaintiff is correct in his contention that errors were 
committed in giving instructions requested by defendant. The 
court gave the unavoidable accident instruction condemned 
in Butigan v. Yellow Cab. 49 Cal.2d 652 P.2d 500]. 
'l'he was also instructed: ''The mere fact that an acci-
dent happened, considered alone, does not support an infer-
ence that some party, or any party, to this action was negli-
gent." \Ve have held where, as here, the uncontradicted 
evidence warrants the application of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur, it is error to give the quoted instruction. (Jensen v. 
1Jiinard, 44 Cal.2d 325, 329 [282 P.2d 7] ; see Shaw v. Pacific 
Greyhound Lines, ante, pp. 153, 156-158 [323 P.2d 391]; 
Phillips v. Noble, ante, pp. 163, 166-167 [323 P.2d 385]; 
Barrera v. De La Torre, 48 Cal.2d 166, 170 et seq. [308 P.2d 
724] ; cf. Brown v. George Foundation, 23 Cal.2d 
256, 261-262 [143 P.2d 929]; England v. Hospital of Good 
Samaritan, 22 Cal..App.2d 226, 230 [70 P.2d 692] ; Ellis v. 
Jewett, 18 Cal.App.2d 629, 634 [64 P.2d 432] .) [7] For the 
reasons set forth in the cited cases holding it is error to give 
the mere happening of the accident instruction where an in-
ference of negligence arises as a matter of law, it is likewise 
error to give that instruction where a presumption of negli-
gence arises as a result of defendant's disobedience of a stat-
ute. The question is whether these errors require a reversal 
of the judgment. ( Const., art. VI, § 4Yz.) 
[8] No precise forrnula can be drawn for deciding whether 
there has been a miscarriage of justice. In each instance the 
determination whether the probable effect of an instruction 
has been to mislead the jury and whether the error has been 
prejudicial so as to require a reversal depends upon all the 
circumstances, including the evidence and the other instruc-
tions given. Here there were instructions that made it clear 
that under the admitted facts a prima facie case has been 
proved against defendant and that, in order to escape liability, 
he must exculpate himself by showing justification or excuse . 
.As we have seen, the evidence on this issue was uncontradicted 
and amply sufficient to show that prior to the accident de-
fendant took reasonable precautions to see that his brakes 
were in good working condition. Under the circumstances it 
does not appear that there has been a miscarriage of justice. 
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[9] The appeal from the "verdict" is dismissed smee no 
appeal lies therefrom. The is affirmed. 
'l'raynor, J., S::hauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
McComb, J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
It is my considered opinion that the giving of the two im-
proper instructions caused a miscarriage of justice and that 
the judgment should be reversed. 
The ephemeral constitutional standard for identifying re-
versible error has not been rendered concrete by judicial effort. 
Certainly the people of California did not intend to nullify 
the right to a jury trial guaranteed by article I, section 7, of 
the California Constitution by adding article VI, section 4lf2, 
which requires a miscarriage of justice to justify a reversal.* 
A proper construction would be consonant with the purpose of 
the amendment which is to relieve the judiciary of the burden 
of retrying eases merely because of technical errors. It does 
not license appellate courts to weigh evidence except where 
it is so massive on one side as to remove the issue from any 
doubt. The statement of this court in Herbert v. Lankershim, 
9 Cal.2d 409 at 476 [71 P.2d 220], is pertinent: That article 
VI, section 41/2 may dispel error only if the justice of the 
case preponderates so obviously that none of the errors could 
have contributed to the findings below. 
To affirm this case because the errors committed were non-
prejudicial, this court has been for·eed to make factual deter-
minations from the record and effectively deprive appellant 
of his right to a jury trial. The majority has determined that 
the inference of negligence raised by the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur and by statutory violation is rebutted by defendant's 
own testimony. 
In Phillips v. Noble, ante, p. 163 [323 P.2d 385], the 
court instructed the jury that the happening of an accident 
does not necessarily mean there was negligence. In dissenting 
( p. 92) I suggested the followin<5 tests for determining preju-
dicial error: 
( 1) If there is a conflict in the evidence concerning defend-
ant's negligence and weak or nonexistent evidence of plain-
*I have discussed this at length in two dissents: Buckley v. Chadwick, 
45 Cnl.2d 183 at 208 [288 P.2d 12, 289 P.2d 242], and People v. Taran-
tino, 45 Cal.2d 590 at 604 [290 P.2d 505]. 
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tiff's contributory negligence, the giving of this instruction 
is prejudiciaL 
(2) If the evidence of defendant's negligence is weak and 
there is substantial evidence of contributory negligence, the 
error is probably nonprejudiciaL 
If plaintiff makes out a prima facie case based on res 
ipsa loquitur applied as a matter of law, it is always prej-
udicial error to the questioned instruction. 
This case clearly falls within tests (1) and (3) above stated. 
THE EFFECT OF THE INSTRUCTIONS UPON THE JURY 
The trial court instructed the jury that if defendant vio-
lated the statutory duty to have proper brakes, then he was 
presumed negligent. The court previously gave the instruc-
tion that the occurrence of an accident does not necessarily 
imply negligence and the unavoidable accident instruction. 
Although res ipsa loquitur applies to this case as a matter of 
law, no instruction on this doctrine was requested. 
The inference arising from defendant's conduct forced him 
to produce evidence powerful enough to convince the jury 
that it was not probable that he was negligent. The effect 
of the instructions was to confuse or erase this imprrssion 
in the jurors' minds. ( Butiga.n v. Yell ow Cab Co., 49 Ca1.2d 
652 [320 P.2d 500] ; J e11sen v. Minard, 44 Cal.2d 325 [282 
P.2d 7] .) This alone has been designated prejudieial error. 
(Davenport v. Stratton, 24 Cal.2d 232 [149 P.2d 4] ; Hyman 
v. Market Street Ry. Co., 41 Cal.App.2d 647 fl07 P.2d 485]; 
Scandalis v. Jenny, 132 Cal.App. 307 [22 P.2d 545].) The 
instruction in the instant case is stronger than in Butigan 
because it omitted the cautionary statement that the defense 
of unavoidable accident may not be used by a defendant who 
did not use ordinary care. The addition of the instrnrtion 
that a collision between two automobiles dors not neeessarily 
imply negligence made the error more damaging than was the 
case in Butigan. 
These instructions probably confnseil the jurv beeausr: 
(1) There could be no evidence of unavoiilable aceident 
in this case under the Butigan rule. A conscientious juror, 
reasonably expecting only pertinent instructions, would natu-
rally search his memory for facts which might fit this pattern. 
The phrase "unavoidable accident" strongly suggests an un-
definable arra of activity betwren defenilant 's nonnrglicyence 
and his slight nrgligence. In the instant case the evidence 
suggests defendant was not grossly negligent. Such negligence 
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as the 
carpet of unavoidable accident. Where the issue of negligence 
is a close one, such an alternative is The confusion 
caused the instructions was here 
by the instruction that an accident of this character does not 
imply 
The inferences out of facts to this 
collision establish on the part of defendant unless 
he proves otherwise. The must its from 
the side of plaintiff, not from a neutral position. These in-
structions tell the jury a and may effectively 
have eliminated the inferences from the minds of the jurors. 
To say they did not is to make a finding of fact by judicial 
prescience. To say it is not clear they did is to place on ap-
pellant the burden of showing they did. Just how any appel-
lant is to prove the effect of these instruetions upon each 
juror's trend of thought is a mystery. But by deciding 
arbitrarily that an appellant must do so the court is taking 
away the right to trial by jury from appellants with justifiable 
complaint. This has been held prejudicial. (Russell v. 
Andersen, 101 Cal.App.2d 684, see 697 [226 P.2d 350] ; Bie8er 
v. Davies, 119 Cal.App. 659, sec 664 [7 P.2d 388].) 
Because the inferences were obliterated by the instructions 
the jury did not have to examine drfendant 's evidence. If 
the jury did not think the mere malfunctioning of brakes or 
defendant's sole control of the vehicle was sufficient evidence 
of his negligence, defendant needed no justification in their 
eyes. This court, has determinrd for them that de-
fendant's testimony vvas true and his actions reasonable even 
though the Constitution says the plaintiff may have this de-
termined by a jury of his peers. The majority decision here 
is an excellent example of thP misehicf by this 
court by taking upon itself the job of faet finding. 
DEFENDANT's TESTIMONY DoEs NoT ExPLAIN THE FAILURE 
OF Jirs BRAKES 
According to defendant's own testimony: 
(1) During the five months he owned the car its brakes 
always worked; 
(2) He had his clutch repaired at Newton's Garage two to 
four weeks before the collision. Defendant testified that the 
employees of the garage did not then recommend any repair 
of the brakes. There was no testimony that the brakes were 
Pvcn tested at that time l 
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About two months before the collision defendant had his 
car lubricated. The service station gave defendant a service 
receipt and guarantee which indicated by check marks that 
the wheel brake cables and master cylinder had been inspected 
and lubricated in accordance with the company's lubrication 
No service or were recommended at that 
time . 
.All of this was self-interested of defendant and it 
is open to suspicion for that reason. No inference can be 
drawn from number (2) as to the condition of the brakes at 
that time. The value of testimony under (3) is open to these 
questions: 
(a) How thorough was the station's inspection 1 
(b) How qualified were the personnel to judge the con-
dition of the whole brake system? 
(c) Did defendant inspect the brakes when he bought the 
used car 1 Were his later inspections frequent and thorough 
enough 1 
(d) Assuming the master cylinder and cables were in good 
condition, was the whole system tested? What part of it 
failed and caused the collision~ 
The latter is a vital point. The theory of res ipsa loquitur 
is that the defendant must show what caused the injury be-
cause only he knows. In this case defendant did not present 
this evidence. It was incumbent upon him to show his lack 
of negligence in respect to the very cattse of the accident if 
he was able to do so. (Dierman v. ProV?:ilence Hospital, 31 
Ca1.2d 290 [188 P.2d 12].) He made no effort to do so nor to 
explain why he didn't. His evidence is to be viewed with 
distrust (Code Civ. Proc., § 2061, subd. 7). 
It is the jury's function to determine the truthfulness of 
testimony and it may reject evidence it disbelieves. Therefore 
the fact that it was uncontradicted does not mean it would 
have to be believed. It is also a jury function to determine 
whether particular acts constitute negligence by applying the 
reasonable man test. The processes of a court are legal, not 
mechanical. In this case the majority has usurped all of those 
functions and determined facts from the record. Article VI, 
seetion 4Jfz, and article I, section 7, do not permit us this 
privilege. 
I would therefore reverse the judgment. 
SHENK, J.-I dissent .. 
The evidence shows conclusively that the plaintiff was en-
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tirely faultless in what occurred, his personal injuries 
and damage to his property. The defendant ran into his 
automobile from the rear and there is not the slightest sug-
gestion of negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The defend-
ant was operating his car with defective brakes in violation 
of the law. He was thereby presumptively negligent. 
The true test of his culpability is not whether he did all 
that a reasonable man should to have his mechanical brakes 
kept in good condition, but what he did immediately prior to 
the accident. By his own admission he neglected to use his 
hand brakes. His statement that he was too excited to use 
them did not absolve him from negligence. One of the trage-
dies of the law is that an innocent victim, one entirely without 
fault, is subjected to personal injury, and is without redress, 
as against the operator of an instrumentality put upon the 
highway which may because of its defective condition in the 
hands of the operator, cause harm to another who is entirely 
without fault. The instructions were admittedly erroneous, 
and under the circumstances of this case were prejudicial. 
There is authority in the second group of cases cited in the 
majority opinion to support a conclusion of liability in this 
case as a matter of law. In addition, the judgment could be 
reversed on the theory of Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 
205 Cal. 328 [270 P. 952, 60 A.L.R. 475]. In my opinion 
there has been a miscarriage of justice in this case. The 
judgment should be reversed. 
